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Notes
THE ADMISSIBILITY IN TORT ACTIONS OF
SAFETY PROVISIONS IN PUBLIC CONTRACTS
INTRODUCTION
Contracts between governmental bodies and private contrac-
tors often contain provisions or clauses which appear to provide
for the safety of the public. The safety clauses may be considered
by a court as influencing the standard of care owed by the con-
tracting party to the public. Some courts grant plaintiffs the
status of third party beneficiaries in the contract safety provisions.
Others rule the provisions totally immaterial and inadmissible.
In Summit County Development Corp. v. Bagnoli,1 the Colo-
rado Supreme Court formulated a rule permitting the admissibility
of contract safety provisions for the limited purpose of determining
a standard of care not in excess of the common law standard.
Summit stated:
A public contractors' [sic] express agreement to take
specific precautions is one of the attendant circumstances
to be considered in determining the standard of care in a
particular case providing the specific precautions required
do not establish a higher duty of care than required by the
common law.
2
This Note will analyze the Summit decision and the admis-
sibility and effect of contract safety provisions in other jurisdic-
tions.
1. 441 P.2d 658 (Colo. 1968).
2. Id. at 664.
ANALYSIS OF SUMMIT
The plaintiff in Summit sustained a fractured leg while board-
ing a chair lift under a ski instructor's direction. In a tort action,
plaintiff alleged negligence on the part of the operators of the ski
school and the Summit County Development Corporation, which
operated the ski facility under a special use permit issued by the
United States Forest Service. At the trial, provisions of the use
permit were entered into evidence on the theory that they were
designed for the benefit and protection of the public. The jury
returned a verdict against all defendants.
On appeal the defendants' principle contention3 was that the
trial court committed prejudicial error in admitting paragraph 57
of the Special Use Permit which provided:
The permittee is authorized to conduct a ski school with
headquarters at Breckenridge. The head of the ski school
authorized by this permit shall have passed the Ski In-
structors' Qualification Test given by the Certified Ski
Instructors, Inc. for the Southern Rocky Mountain Region
or by any similar group for the National Ski Association.
Other instructors in the ski school, if not certified, shall
give instruction only under his immediate supervision.
4
At the time of the plaintiff's injury one of the two operators
of the ski school was qualified under paragraph 57; the other was
not. Plaintiff's instructor had not passed a National Ski Associ-
ation Test. He was, however, certified by the Norwegian Ski
Federation.
The court held paragraph 57 to be irrelevant and immaterial'
to the alleged negligence of the defendants. It reasoned that the
evidence showed no violation of paragraph 57 and added that
because the clause lacked specificity regarding the precautions to
be taken, no violation could have been shown. The court then
stated that even if there had been a lack of compliance, it would
have been abstract and remote to the issue of the defendants'
3. On appeal the supreme, court first dealt with the defendants'
contention that the trial court should have instructed the jury on assump-
tion of risk. They found no error in the lower court's refusal to give these
instructions as there was no evidence to indicate the plaintiff had any
knowledge or appreciation of the particular risk. The defendants also
assigned error to the instruction that they must exercise the highest de-
gree of care commensurate with the practical operation of the ski lift. The
court felt it was not necessary to classify the defendant as a common
carrier, but stated that a ski lift, like other transportation facilities, re-
quires the exercise of the highest degree of care since the passenger com-
pletely surrenders himself to the care and custody of the carrier. The con-
tention of prejudicial error was similarly rejected regarding the refusal
of the lower court to admit into evidence the defendant's motion pictures
of the lift in operation. The film was taken under ideal conditions show-
ing skiers boarding the lift with ease.. This could have been unduly prej-
udicial to the plaintiff, who had no experience in the use of the ski lift.
4. 441 P.2d 658, 662 (Colo. 1968).
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alleged negligence since plaintiff had not established a causal con-
nection between any alleged violation and her injury.5
After disposing of the issue in Summit by a decision based
solely on the facts of the case, the court considered whether safety
provisions in public contracts are ever admissible to establish a
standard of care in tort actions brought against a contractor by a
person not a party to the contract. Such provisions, according to
the court, ". . . should be admissible along with other evidence in
tort actions to assist in determining the standard of care."6  To
be admissible, however, these provisions must be specific, clearly
itemized and unambiguous, 7 and they may not ". . . establish a
higher duty of care than required by the common law."'  The
court recognized a split of authority concerning the admissibility
of contract safety provisions but did not discuss the conflicting
opinions. The reasoning given for its decision was simply that the




The admissibility of contract safety provisions in a tort action
is closely related to the concept of third party beneficiary con-
tracts. A third party beneficiary must ordinarily show that the
contracting parties intended the contract to be for his benefit or
for the benefit of a class to which he belongs. Even though a
third party will be benefited if the performance occurs, or dis-
appointed if it does not, he is an incidental beneficiary with no
rights under the contract unless it was the primary intention of
the contracting parties to benefit him when the contract was exe-
cuted.1" Most public contracts are construction contracts involv-
ing roads, bridges, public buildings and the like. Older cases were
quite liberal in allowing a member of the public to claim third
5. Id. at 662.
6. Id. at 663.
7. Id. at 664: "It is basic and elementary . . .that before such a
provision of a public contract can be received into evidence, the required
precautions must be specific, clearly itemized and unambiguous."
8. Id. at 664.
9. Id. at 663. The court here cited Fluor Corp. v. Black, 338 F.2d
830 (9th Cir. 1964); Davis v. Nelson-Deppe, Inc., 91 Idaho 463, 424 P.2d
733 (1967); Foster v. Herbison Constr. Co., 263 Minn. 63, 115 N.W.2d 915
(1962); Larson v. Heintz Constr. Co., 219 Ore. 25, 345 P.2d 835 (1959).
10. See 1 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§ 776-77 (1952); L. SIMPSON, CON-
TRACTS § 116 (2d ed. 1965).
party beneficiary rights in an action on the contract.1 ' Recent
decisions indicate a more conservative attitude and in the absence
of specific language to the contrary, most jurisdictions no longer
consider public contracts as intending third party beneficiary
rights.12 Most jurisdictions do not consider these to be third party
beneficiary contracts13 in the absence of specific provisions.1
4
Whether a person should be able to bring an action as a third
party beneficiary of a public contract must rest upon the facts of
the case before the court. Many decisions have not clearly stated
whether recovery was allowed under a contract right or under a
tort duty imposed by the provisions of the contract." Confusion
11. In Sullivan v. Staten Island E.R.R., 50 App. Div. 558, 64 N.Y.S. 91
(1900), a contractor agreed to leave streets and sidewalks in a safe and
passable condition and to keep all dangerous places properly guarded and
lighted at night. He was held liable for injuries sustained by a member
of the public who stepped in an unguarded hole. Indicating this liberal
approach, the court stated:
[C]ontractors with the state or a municipal corporation who as-
sume, for a consideration received from the granting power, by
covenant, expressed or implied, to do certain things necessary for
the safety or well-being of the public, are liable, in case of neglect
to perform such covenant, to a private action at the suit of thegarty injured by such neglect, and such contract inures to the
enefit of the individual who is interested in its performance.
Id. at 559; 64 N.Y.S. at 91. See also St. Paul Water Co. v. Ware, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall) 566 (1873); Martin v. Farr Bros. Co., 211 Ill. App. 235 (1918);
Phinney v. Boston E. Ry., 201 Mass. 286, 87 N.E. 490 (1909).
12. See Holland v. Phillips, 94 Ga. App. 361, 94 S.E.2d 503 (1956);
Visintine & Co. v. New York, C. & S. L. R.R., 169 Ohio St. 505, 160 N.E.2d
311 (1959); Oman Constr. Co. v. Tennessee C. Ry., 211 Tenn. 556, 370
S.W.2d 563 (1963); Austin v. Schmedes, 270 S.W.2d 442 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954); Collins Constr. Co. v. Taylor, 372 S.W.2d 548 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963).
13. Accord, RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 145 (1932):
A promisor bound to the United States or to a State or mu-
nicipality by contract to do an act or render a service to some or
all of the members of the public, is subject to no duty under the
contract to such members to give compensation for the injurious
consequences of performing or attempting to perform it, or of fail-
ing to do so....
A leading case cited in many jurisdictions is Styles v. F.R. Long Co., 67
N.J.L. 413, 51 A. 710 (1902); aff'd, 70 N.J.L. 301, 57 A. 448 (1903). The
defendant had contracted with the county to keep a bridge in good re-
pair which would benefit those who wished to travel on it. The court
found that the public was not intended to be the beneficiary of the
contract, and it could maintain no action for its breach. The court stated
that it was not enough that the plaintiff may have been benefited by the
contract. He could maintain the action only if the contract was made for
him.
14. If the contractor promises to pay damages to any person injured,
the plaintiff can generally maintain an action on the contract. RESTATE-
MENT OF CONTRACTS § 145 (1932) cited in note 13 supra continues:
• . . unless, (a) an intention is manifested in the contract, as in-
terpreted in the light of the circumstances surrounding its forma-
tion, that the promisor shall compensate members of the public for
such injurious consequences....
See Pennsylvania Cement Co. v. Bradley Contr. Co., 7 F.2d 822 (2d Cir.
1925); Freigy v. Gararo Co., 223 Ind. 342, 60 N.E.2d 288 (1945).
15. See, e.g., Alameda County v. Tiealau, 44 Cal. App. 332, 186 P.
398 (1919). The contractor was found liable to a motorcyclist who collided
Notes
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has resulted by extending third party beneficiary concepts into
tort actions. Such extension is undesirable for obvious reasons:
Tort actions require allegations different from those necessary in
contract, a breach of contract is not necessarily evidence of negli-
gence, and a good defense in tort is of little avail in an action on a
contract.
The above reasons apply only to prevent mixture of contract
and tort principles, not to prevent joinder of tort and contract
actions in the same suit. In the proper factual setting, the plain-
tiff should be free to seek recovery under both contract and tort
theories, and in many jurisdictions it is now possible to bring both
actions in the same suit.16 For the sake of expediency and con-
venience joinder of actions is acceptable practice, but even if
brought jointly the causes of action are separate and distinct. If,
in accordance with the law of contracts, plaintiff is able to prove
his rights and defendant's failure to comply under the contract,
he should be able to recover for a breach of his contractual rights.
If, on the other hand, he is unsuccessful in proving a right under
the contract, his case must rest solely upon the principles of negli-
gence.
7
with an unlighted gravel pile. The contract, which required the contractor
to maintain guards and lights, had been admitted into evidence without
objection. The opinion did not indicate whether the recovery was based
on the failure of the defendant to meet the provisions of the contract or
whether the liability arose out of the contractor's negligence independently
of the contractual stipulations.
16. See, e.g., Kane v. Mendenhall, 5 Cal. 2d 749, 56 P.2d 498 (1936);
Craft Refrig. Mach. Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 29 A.
76 (1893); Cockrell v. Henderson, 81 Kan. 335, 105 P. 443 (1909); Hacker v.
Nitschke, 310 Mass. 754, 39 N.E.2d 644 (1942); Tate v. Bates, 118 N.C. 287,
24 S.E. 482 (1896); Stark County v. Mischel, 33 N.D. 432, 156 N.W. 931
(1916); Aylesbury Mercantile Co. v. Fitch, 22 Okla. 475, 99 P. 1089 (1908);
Pollack v. Carolina Interstate Bldg. & L. Ass'n., 48 S.C. 65, 25 S.E. 977
(1896); McHard v. Williams, 8 S.D. 381, 66 N.W. 930 (1896); Littlefield v.
Bowen, 90 Wash. 286, 155 P. 1053 (1916); Emerson v. Nash, 124 Wis. 369,
102 N.W. 921 (1905).
17. In Styles v. F.R. Long Co., 67 N.J.L. 413, 51 A. 710 (1902), aff'd,
70 N.J.L. 301, 57 A. 448 (1904), the defendant was held not liable to the
plaintiff injured by its failure to light a bridge during construction as re-
quired by the contract. The court said:
The effect of the charge was to confine the attention of the jury
to the contract alone, both as imposing a duty on the defendant
and as defining what that duty was; so that they were constrained
to find the defendant guilty of actionable negligence if it failed to
sufficiently light the bridge. . ..
Id. at 416, 51 A. at 712.
IT]he rule that no one can sue upon a contract unless he is a
party to it cannot be evaded by bringing what is really an action
for breach of contract in the form of an action of tort.
Id. at 419, 51 A. at 713.
TORT THEORY
The remainder of this Note will deal exclusively with tort
actions. It will consider the admissibility of safety provisions in
public contracts and the effect of such provisions upon the alleged
standard of care.
There is a minority view characterized by the Utah case, Met-
calf v. Mellen,'8 which holds that safety provisions in the contract
create a duty and a responsibility to a third party greater than
that required by the common law.19 Montana 20 and Nevada 2' de-
cisions currently conform with Metcalf. Wisconsin appears to be
the most liberal jurisdiction regarding the use of contracts in tort
actions. In Presser v. Siesel Construction Co.,22 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court rejected the rationale "that the contract is only one
factor bearing on the question of ordinary care under the cir-
cumstances" and stated:
It imposes the standard of care and the obligation to the
plaintiff. A general contractor by contract may assume a
duty of care for the benefit of others than the promisee
over and above such common law liability for negligence
which would otherwise be applicable to the facts. The
contract . . . obligated the contractor to comply with all
pertinent provisions . . . in order to provide for the
safety of the employees and other persons.28
This decision could be construed to render a contractor liable for
any violation, however slight, of safety provisions in the contract.
This minority view appears to give plaintiffs identical rights in
tort as a legitimate third party beneficiary in a contract action.
The main question of fact for the jury to decide is not whether a
defendant was negligent, but whether he failed to perform the
specific contract duties. In order for a third party to be able to re-
cover in an action on a contract, he should have to prove that it
was the intent of the parties to make the contract for his benefit.
In a tort action, plaintiff should have to prove negligence. The
Presser holding could permit recovery even if plaintiff has proved
neither the intent of the parties nor negligence. Only Wisconsin
follows this reasoning although several other courts have yet to
overrule their previous decisions which permit the provisions of a
contract to increase the defendant's standard of care to some de-
18. 57 Utah 44, 192 P. 676 (1920).
19. See also Karle v. Reed, 1 Cal. App. 2d 144, 36 P.2d 150 (1934).
New York Pneumatic Service Co. v. P.T. Fox Contr. Co., 201 App. Div. 33,
193 N.Y.S. 655 (1922), aff'd, 235 N.Y. 567, 139 N.E. 737 (1923), is often
cited in illustration of this proposition, but apparently it has not been
followed in its own jurisdiction.
20. Ulmen v. Schwieger, 91 Mont. 331, 12 P.2d 856 (1932).
21. Fredrickson & Watson Constr. Co. v. Boyd, 60 Nev. 117, 102 P.2d
627 (1940).
22. 19 Wis. 2d 54, 119 N.W.2d 405 (1963).
23. Id. at 59, 119 N.W.2d at 408.
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gree above his common law duty.24
Another view, finding support in the older cases, generally
denies the admission of the contract for any purpose in an action
in tort.2 5 Under this view, if the plaintiff is not a third party
beneficiary, he can make no use of the contract. 26 Of those older
cases that involve the question of admissibility of the contract safety
provisions in tort actions, none covers the precise point raised in
Summit-whether the provisions may be used to assist in deter-
mining the standard of care so long as they do not increase the
defendant's common law duty. Wymer-Harris Construction Co. v.
Glass,17 a leading Ohio case, holds that contract safety provisions
cannot be used to impose a higher degree of duty on the con-
tractor than is required by statute or law. The Summit view of
using the provisions as some evidence of the standard of care was
not considered.
In the older cases, safety provisions were usually held in-
admissible without any discussion of their bearing on the standard
of care. 8 In 1928, however, the Supreme Court of Colorado, in
Lewis v. La Nier,29 stated:
This is an action based on negligence; it is pleaded as such;
it was tried and submitted to the jury as such. The
measure of the defendants' duty in this case is to be deter-
mined by the law governing negligence cases, not by the
provisions of the contract.3
0
The court prefaced these remarks by stating, "If the contention
is that the defendants are liable in this action for a failure to do the
things specified in the contract ... regardless of whether or not
such failure constituted negligence, the contention cannot be main-
24. See, e.g., cases cited in notes 20 and 21 supra.
25. See, e.g., Lewis v. La Nier, 84 Colo. 376, 270 P. 656 (1928);
Lydecker v. Passaic County, 91 N.J.L 622, 103 A. 251 (1918); Styles v. F.R.
Long Co., 67 N.J.L 413, 51 A. 710 (1902); Wymer-Harris Constr. Co. v.
Glass, 122 Ohio St. 398, 171 N.E. 857 (1930); Oliver v. Lettaconsett Constr.
Co., 36 R.I. 477, 90 A. 764 (1914); Davis v. Mellen, 55 Utah 9, 182 P. 920
(1919).
26. See cases cited note 25 supra. These cases reasoned that a plain-
tiff in a negligence action who bases his suit upon the theory of a duty
owed to him by the defendant as a result of a contract must be a party or
privy to the contract or else he fails to establish a duty toward himself
owed by the defendant, and fails to show any wrong done to himself.
27. 122 Ohio St. 398, 171 N.E. 857 (1930).
28. See, e.g., Lydecker v. Passaic County, 91 N.J.L 622, 103 A. 251
(1918); Oliver v. Lettaconsett Constr. Co., 36 R.I. 477, 90 A. 764 (1914);
Davis v. Mellen, 55 Utah 9, 182 P. 920 (1919).
29. 84 Colo. 376, 270 P. 656 (1928).
30. Id. at 383, 270 P. at 658-59.
tained."' Reflecting a change in their view forty years later,
the same court in Summit referred to Lewis as follows:
The trial court's refusal to admit the provisions of the
contract was upheld against the plaintiff's contention that
the contract established her right to sue as a third party
beneficiary, and that the contract provisions established
defendants' duty of care. We there held only that plaintiff
had a statutory right to sue independent of the contract,
and that the "measure of the defendants' duty in this case
is to be determined by the law governing negligence
cases, not by the provisions of the contract." This holding
consequently does not answer the question presented in
the instant case, namely, whether the contract's safety
provisions, though not supplanting the common law stand-
ard of due care, would be admissible as evidence of what
the standard of care would be under the circumstances
shown.
3 2
By extremely narrowing the scope of the Lewis decision, the court
was able to decide Summit as a case of first impression and adopt
a rule permitting the use of safety provisions as some evidence of
the standard of care in tort actions if this does not increase the
common law standard of care. 8
The current trend is toward the reasoning of Summit.3 4 In
that opinion, the court cited four recent cases 35 after stating, "the
better-reasoned view, supported by the weight of recent authority,
is that safety provisions in public contracts should be admissible
along with other evidence in tort actions to assist in determining
the standard of care. '36 In Larson v. Heintz Construction Co.,
3 7
the Oregon Supreme Court stated:
In spite of the lack of local precedent we think that
a construction contract which requires the use of warning
signals is, by the weight of reason and authority, admissible
in evidence against the contractor. We prefer not to
ground our decision on a ruling that we have here a third
party beneficiary contract and that the standard of care
imposed by the contract supersedes that required by the
common law. This is an action for damages arising out
of negligence, and the contractor's duty even in the face
of such a contract remains a duty to use reasonable care.
31. Id.
32. 441 P.2d 658, 663 (Colo. 1968). (Italics added).
33. Id. at 664.
34. Accord, Williams v. Tillett Bros. Constr. Co., 319 F.2d 300 (6th
Cir 1963); Stuart v. Berry, 107 Ga. App. 531, 130 S.E.2d 838 (1963); Dor-
nack v. Barton Constr. Co., 272 Minn. 307, 137 N.E.2d 536 (1965); Briscoe
v. Worley, 208 Okla, 60, 253 P.2d 145 (1952).
35. Fluor Corp. v. Black, 338 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1964); Davis v. Nel-
son-Deppe, Inc., 91 Idaho 463, 424 P.2d 733 (1967); Foster v. Herbison Con-
str. Co., 263 Minn. 63, 115 N.W.2d 915 (1962); Larson v. Heintz Constr. Co.,
219 Ore. 25, 345 P.2d 835 (1959).
36. 441 P.2d 658, 663 (Colo. 1968).
37. 219 Ore. 25, 345 P.2d 835 (1959).
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But reasonableness depends on the circumstances, and here
the contract was a circumstance.
8
In deciding Foster v. Herbison Construction Co.,9 the Minne-
sota Supreme Court had local precedent holding that the provisions
of a public contract could be used to determine due care.40 After
discussing both sides of the question, the court affirmed its position
on admissibility by stating:
Without getting into the peripheral area of rights
acquired by the traveling public under such contract pro-
visions, it would seem that when a contractor undertakes
to maintain a road under construction . . . in such a way
as to insure the safety of those traveling over the con-
struction zone, such agreement has some evidentiary value
in establishing what is due care.
[TIhe contract should be admissible-not to establish that
defendant owes a duty to plaintiff, but to help establish
what the already existing duty is.
41
These recent cases indicate that in those jurisdictions that
have ruled on the use of contract safety provisions as evidence in
tort actions, there is a discernible trend toward admissibility. The
older decisions holding that safety provisions in public contracts
are not admissible are gradually being limited to their specific
factual situations, overlooked or overruled.
42
Summit stated that safety provisions in public contracts should
be admissible in tort actions along with other evidence to assist in
determining the standard of care provided the provisions are
specific, clearly itemized and unambiguous and that they do not
38. Id. at 52-53, 345 P.2d at 848.
39. 263 Minn. 63, 115 N.W.2d 915 (1962).
40. In Rengstorf v. Winston Bros. Co., 167 Minn. 290, 208 N.W. 995
(1926), the court held:
The contract was between defendant and the state. The deceased
was not a party thereto, and his personal representative cannot
predicate any right thereon. To that extent the rule of Winter-
bottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 107 and Heaven v. Pender, L.R. 9
Q.B.Div. 302, remains undoubted law.
The only duty of defendant with which plaintiff is not con-
cerned was to execute the work with due care to prevent injury to
those lawfully using it pending its construction. The provisions
of the contract are therefore material only to the extent that they
impose obligations for the benefit of users of the road, and so may
have something to say to the question of due care. Otherwise the
contract is immaterial. It is not the basis of liability but merely a
fact for consideration.
Id. at 292, 208 N.W. at 996.
41. 263 Minn. at 69-70, 115 N.W.2d at 919.
42. Contra, Visintine & Co. v. New York C. & S. L. R.R., 169 Ohio
St. 505, 160 N.E.2d 311 (1959) indicating that Wymer-Harris is still
controlling.
establish a duty higher than that required by common law.45 It
is not as important, however, that the duty be specific and unam-
biguous as it is that the failure to perform be clear. The Foster
and Larson cases provide good examples of this distinction. 4 In
Foster, the provision of the contract used by the plaintiff required
the defendant to conduct his construction so as to minimize the
inconvenience to traffic and provide a smooth and drained roadway.
The plaintiff's truck encountered a water-filled chuckhole which
provided sufficient evidence to show that the defendant failed to
meet the specifications of the contract. The safety clause in Larson
read as follows:
BARRICADES, WARNING SIGNS AND FLAGMEN.
The contractor shall at his expense and without further
or other order provide, erect and maintain at all times
during the progress or temporary suspension of the work
suitable barricades, fences, signs or other adequate pro-
tection, and shall provide, keep and maintain such danger
lights, signals and flagmen as may be necessary or may
be ordered by the engineer to insure the safety of the
public as well as those engaged in connection with the
work. All barricades and obstructions shall be protected
at night by signal lights which shall be suitably distributed
across the roadway. ..4
Such language as "suitable barricades ...or other adequate pro-
tection" and "as may be necessary" can hardly be described as
specific, clear or unambiguous. In such a situation, however, it is
difficult to envision how safety specifications could be drawn to
meet the requirements of the Summit holding in this regard. The
Summit court stated that the phrase, "under his immediate
supervision," was ambiguous and therefore inadmissible. It is not
realistic to expect construction contracts to be written with the
precision demanded by Summit. It is therefore suggested that the
court should have held that plaintiff failed as a matter of law to
prove specifically and clearly that defendant had failed to perform
as required by the contract. Since the general policy invoked by
Summit is in keeping with Larson, Foster and other similar de-
cisions the Colorado court will probably limit the Summit require-
ment of unambiguity to the specific facts of that case or to the
43. 441 P.2d 658, 664 (Colo. 1968):
The duty in negligence actions remains one of exercising due
care, and due care depends upon the attendant circumstances. A
public contractors' [sic] express agreement to take specific precau-
tions is one of the attendant circumstances to be considered in de-
termining the standard of care in a particular case providing
the specific precautions required do not establish a higher duty
of care than required by the common law. It is basic and ele-
mentary, however, that before such a provision of a public con-
tract can be received into evidence, the required precautions must
be specific, clearly itemized and unambiguous.
44. See also Fluor Corp. v. Black, 338 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1964);
Davis v. Nelson-Deppe, Inc., 91 Idaho 463, 424 P.2d 733 (1967).
45. 219 Ore. at 37, 345 P.2d at 840-41.
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particular type of contract in question.
An objection to the admissibility of specific and unambiguous
provisions is derived from the apparent attempt of the parties to
establish a standard of care among themselves. This reasoning
has been extended to hold that an agreement by a contractor to
take specific precautions is not to be used as the standard of care
owed by the contractor to a third party.46  Accordingly, the court
in State Construction Co. v. Johnson47 stated:
[T] he fact that the defendant agreed with the State High-
way Department as to the particular method to be used in
warning the public is not binding upon third persons'
who are members of the public not parties to the contract.
. . . [T] he defendant. . . owed the public a duty to exer-
cise ordinary care to warn passers-by . . . and it would be
contrary to public policy to permit the parties to a contract
to establish by agreement among themselves what specific
acts by either of them would constitute ordinary care as
to third persons. . . . In consequence, whether or not the
barricade contracted to be erected should have been erected
by the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care for the
protection of the members of the public remained an issue
of fact for the determination of the jury .... 48
This argument, however, is applicable only to those cases such as
Presser v. Siesel Construction Co.49 which permit the contract to
impose the standard of care.50 It becomes practically meaningless
when considered in conjunction with the second requirement of
Summit which admits safety provisions only if they do not in-
crease the standard of care above the common law requirement.
Thus, the specifications are not admissible if the parties have con-
tracted for a duty above the common law standard. Conversely,
if the provisions described a lower standard, plaintiff will not
attempt to use the contract.
The requirement that the safety provisions, to be admissible,
must not increase the common law standard of care seems, at first
glance, an impossibility. For example, if a plaintiff could recover
under the common law standard of care, then the safety provisions
are not necessary for his case and there is no reason for their
admission. If liability, however, would not be imposed except for
the provisions, they obviously increase the common law duty. This
46. See, e.g., Stafford v. Thornton, 420 S.W.2d 153, 158 (Tex. Civ. App.
1967).
47. 88 Ga. App. 651, 77 S.E.2d 240 (1953).
48. Id. at 657, 77 S.E.2d at 244-45.
49. 19 Wis. 2d 54, 119 N.W.2d 405 (1963).
50. For a discussion of these cases, see text accompanying notes 18-27
supra.
logic, however, is not necessarily sound. There may be cases where
the jury would be at a loss to determine exactly what specific
acts on the part of the defendant would constitute the requisite
common law standard of care. It is in this determination that the
contract becomes important. Plaintiff's counsel will argue that
the defendant's act or failure to act was negligence. The defendant
will try to convince the jury that he did everything that could
have been reasonably expected of him under the circumstances.
A good indication of the requisite degree of care may well be
found in the safety provisions of the contract. If the parties
stated when they entered into the contract that a particular thing
should be done to protect the public, it is reasonable to assume that
the parties felt such precautions were required in exercising rea-
sonable care. Granted, such specifications cannot be used to fix
the defendant's duty, but they do define particular hazards and
recommend particular precautions and can, therefore, be a valuable
aid in determining what precautions are demanded by the common
law standard of care. This reasoning is reflected in the following
portion of the Foster opinion:
Both contracting parties have agreed on a course of conduct
deemed essential for the protection of those using the high-
way. It is unnecessary to hold that those injured as a
result of the contractor's failure to do that which he agreed
with the state he would do have any rights under the
contract. A recognition by the contracting parties that
certain acts should be done to protect the traveling
public-followed by a failure to perform such acts-does
however have some bearing on the establishment of negli-
gence. The ultimate question still is: What would an
ordinarily prudent person have done under the same or
similar circumstances? But here we might well say that
an ordinarily prudent person, having agreed to perform
certain acts for the protection of the public, would have
recognized the necessity of complying therewith and
that, when injury results from a condition which develops
due to the failure to perform according to the contract, it
could be found that the failure to perform constitutes a
lack of due care.51
Although the court in Summit did not declare the defendant
to be a common carrier, it nevertheless required the exercise of the
highest degree of care commensurate with the practical operation
of the ski lift facility.52 Since the defendants' employee was in-
structing the plaintiff in the use of the lift, this duty was imputed
to him by ordinary agency doctrines. His qualifications as an in-
structor were, therefore, material. Paragraph 57 of the Special
Use Permit required that he be properly certified or be under
the "immediate supervision" of his employer, who was so certi-
51. 263 Minn. at 69, 115 N.W.2d at 919.
52. 441 P.2d 658, 664 (Colo. 1968).
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fied.53 Because of the required duty of the highest degree of care,
the specifications would not serve to increase the common law
standard and would therefore be admissible. Suppose, however,
the plaintiff had not been injured on the lift, but rather while
she was receiving skiing lessons from the instructor. Under these
circumstances, the defendants would have a duty of merely ordi-
nary care in conducting the instruction. Their specific duty
would be to provide an instructor with the same qualifications as
would be furnished by a reasonably prudent like facility under
the same or similar circumstances. Under these conditions, the
contract requirement that the instructor be specifically certified
could possibly indicate a higher standard of care for the defendant
than required by the common law. On the other hand, it may
only be a precaution required by ordinary care. This is a deter-
mination to be made by the court in passing on the admissibility of
the contract provisions. The reasonableness of the contract is a
matter of law.5
CONCLUSION
It is extremely difficult to determine exactly what effect the
admissibility of the contract safety provisions will have. There
will certainly be cases granting recovery where the jury would not
find the defendant liable in the absence of the safety requirements.
The defendant, however, should be well aware of these require-
ments which the parties apparently felt were necessary for the safe
prosecution of the work. They are some indication of the appro-
priate care under the circumstances. When injury occurs, the
safety provisions can serve as a form of expert testimony of
exactly what should or should not have been done, and as such,
should be admissible. The burden is on the court to insure that
the provisions do not exceed the requisite degree of care and are
relevant and material to the issue of the defendant's alleged
negligence. It is then for the jury to weigh these provisions
along with all other evidence to determine the specific require-
ments of the defendant's common law duty to the plaintiff and to
establish if he has met this standard of care.
WILLIAM A. ADDAMS
53. See note 3 supra.
54. McClendon v. T. L. James & Co., 231 F.2d 802, 805 (5th Cir. 1956).
See also Larson v. Heintz Constr. Co., 219 Ore. 25, 345 P.2d 835 (1959).
